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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner,
v.
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W.
BARRETT,
Respondent.
INOKE VIMAHI,
Real Party in Interest.

:
:
:

:

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST/
DEFENDANT INOKE VIMAHFS
RESPONSE TO STATE'S PETITION
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
CHALLENGING ORDERS
REDUCING CONVICTIONS
Case No. 20040763-SC
District Court Case No. 031902300FS

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Real Party in Interest/Defendant Inoke Vimahi ("Real Party in Interest'1 or
fl

Vimahil!) is the defendant in Third District Court case State v. Vimahi, case number

031902300FS, the underlying criminal case in which the order at issue arose. Because
the legislature has not provided the state with the ability to appeal a sentence reduction
order, the state is attempting to use a petition for extraordinary relief in an effort to
challenge a sentence reduction order on appeal. Vimahi contends that the state cannot
receive extraordinary relief to correct what it claims is a simple mistake of law when the
legislature has not afforded the state the ability to appeal. See. Point I, infra. Although
this Court has jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(2) (2002), extraordinary relief is not appropriate in this case. A copy of the
judgment the state seeks to have reviewed is in Addendum A. A copy of this Court's
order requesting full briefing is in Addendum B.

ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE 1. Whether extraordinary relief is appropriate when the state seeks to
correct what it contends is an error in analyzing a statute where the legislature has
precluded the state from appealing the order at issue.
Standard of review. This issue involves a question of law. See generally State v.
Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (reviewing question of whether state can
obtain extraordinary relief as a question of law). When a party is seeking extraordinary
relief and "the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not
extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its
authority." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(4). In order to grant extraordinary relief under Rule
65B(d)(2)(A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court must have committed a gross
and flagrant abuse of discretion. Stirba, 972 P.2d at 923; Renn v. Utah State Bd. of
Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995).
Preservation. The state filed its petition for extraordinary relief directly with this
Court. The issue of whether extraordinary relief can be granted in these circumstances is
an issue to be decided by this Court regardless of whether the issue was raised below.
See Stirba. 972 P.2d 918 (reviewing state's request for extraordinary relief and denying
that request).
ISSUE 2. Whether the district court grossly and flagrantly abused its discretion in
interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2003), which allowed the court to reduce the
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degree of offense for which Vimahi was convicted by one degree, when it reduced
Vimahi's conviction from afirstdegree felony with an enhanced sentence to a second
degree felony.
Standard of review. In order to grant extraordinary relief, this Court must
conclude that the trial court grossly and flagrantly abused its discretion. Renn, 904 P.2d
at 683. Moreover, on direct appeal, this Court "'traditionally afford[s] the trial court
wide latitude and discretion in sentencing . . . .'" State v. Boyd. 2001 UT 30, f31, 25
P.3d 985 (citations omitted). On appeal, this Court "give[s] deference to a trial court
when reviewing issues of sentencing" and will overturn a sentencing decision "only
when it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Id, This Court reviews a trial court's
interpretation of a statute for correctness. Grvnberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8,
1J28,70P.3dl.
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutes and constitutional provisions is in Addendum C.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2) (2002);
Article VIII, section 3, Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information dated April 2, 2003, the state charged Real Party in Interest
Inoke Vimahi and three co-defendants with Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony;
3

Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony; and Theft, a first degree felony.
RV. 2-5.] The Information also gave notice that the charges were subject to the
"enhanced penalty" provided by the in-concert or "gang" enhancement provisions found
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (2003). RV. 2-3.
Vimahi waived his preliminary hearing. R. 158:1,5. Pursuant to a plea bargain,
Vimahi pled guilty to Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, as charged in Count I,
with a gang enhancement. RV. 98-105, 107. Counts II and III were dismissed.
On June 14, 2004, Vimahi filed a motion to reduce his conviction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2003). RV. 109. Vimahi had a change of counsel prior to
sentencing and new counsel also filed a written motion to reduce sentence. RV. 130,
134-38. Copies of these motions are in Addendum D. The state filed a written motion
objecting to the reduction. RV. 116-123. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on
September 13, 2004. RV. 143-44. After the parties argued the reduction motion, the

1

The state is requesting identical extraordinary relief from this Court in codefendant James Kida Pauu's case and has filed a single brief to address the issues in
both cases. As allowed by this Court's order dated November 18, 2004, Real Parties in
Interest Pauu and Vimahi are filing separate briefs addressing the issue. The record in
this Court contains the trial court record for Real Party in Interest Pauu's case as well as
the trial court record for Real Party in Interest Vimahi's case. The district court file in
Pauu's case is numbered 1 through 157; the district court file in Vimahi's case is
numbered 1 through 162. The transcripts are numbered R. 158 -163. In order to avoid
confusion, Vimahi refers to the trial court file in his case as RV and the district court file
in co-defendant Pauu's case as RP. Vimahi refers to the transcripts in his case, both of
which are numbered as 163, chronologically as 163A and 163B. Vimahi refers to the
transcripts in Pauu's case as RP. 159 and RP. 160. Vimahi refers to the transcript of the
waiver of the preliminary hearing, which applies in both cases, as R. 158.
4

trial court granted the motion for reduction and imposed sentence for Aggravated
Robbery reduced to a second degree felony. RV. 143-44; see_ amended judgment in
Addendum A.
On November 10, 2004, almost sixty days after judgment, the state filed a petition
for extraordinary relief in this Court, asking this Court to review the trial court's order
and also asking the Court to consolidate this case with co-defendant Pauu's case. On
November 18, 2004, this Court entered an order requesting full briefing on this case and
that of co-defendant Vimahi. A copy of that order is in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts giving rise to the charges in this case are not pertinent to the issue raised
by the state in its petition for extraordinary relief. As part of the plea, Vimahi admitted
the following:
On March 26, 2003 at 1025 East 8600 South in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, I, Vimahi unlawfully and intentionally [sic] or attempted to take
personal property in the possession of Scott Burk from the person of Scott
Burke [sic], i.e. money from a slot machine that was in his home - a knife
was used by the co-defendant to threaten Mr. Burk.
RV. 99. According to a discussion at sentencing, the defendants took
methamphetamines from Mr. Burk "and there was an AK-47 found in his apartment."
RV. 163B:8. Mr. Burk had been the victim of a similar crime by others in the past and
"is either a drug dealer or a drug user and gets involved with this type of behavior."
RV. 163B:8.
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In arguing the reduction motion, defense counsel informed the trial court that
Vimahi had been offered a second degree felony. RV. 163B:6. Burk could not pick
Vimahi out of a lineup, and co-defendant Pantoja told the prosecutor and defense counsel
that Vimahi stayed in the car for awhile and was "scraggling behind the other codefendants." RV. 163B:6. Vimahi waived his preliminary hearing after being offered
the second degree felony. RV. 163B:7. The state subsequently withdrew Vimahi's offer
when it obtained a fingerprint attributed to Vimahi at the scene. RV. 163B:6. Vimahi
was on probation for reckless endangerment and was facing federal charges.
RV. 163B:5, 11. He was 23 years old. RV. 163B:7.
Co-defendant Maile, who was on probation for robbery, was convicted of a
second degree felony. RV. 163B:7. The trial court had also reduced co-defendant's
Pauu's conviction to a second degree felony. RP. 160. Although at sentencing, defense
counsel acknowledged that "[t]he victim says three people went to the apartment"
(RV. 163B:9) and the plea affidavit notified Vimahi that the state was seeking a
sentencing enhancement based on the offense being "committed in concert with two or
more persons" (R. 98), the plea affidavit does not include an admission from Vimahi that
he acted in concert with two or more persons. R. 99.
Following argument, the trial court "grant[ed] the motion to reduce sentencing to
an indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of one to 15 years . . . ." RV. 163B:11.

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Extraordinary relief is not appropriate in this case where the legislature has
precluded the state from appealing but the state nevertheless is attempting to use the
extraordinary relief procedure to conduct the same review and receive the same relief it
would if it were to appeal the case. Where the legislature has precluded the government
from appealing, extraordinary relief procedures cannot be used to circumvent that
restriction. Instead, extraordinary relief is available only when the trial court grossly and
flagrantly abuses its discretion. Such gross and flagrant abuse of discretion is not akin to
the ordinary abuse of discretion required for reversal on appeal. Instead, extraordinary
relief is limited to circumstances where the state establishes a flagrant abuse and
extraordinary conditions. In this case where the trial court followed accepted rules of
statutory construction and based its decision on the plain language of the relevant
statutes, the court did not flagrantly abuse its discretion in analyzing the reduction statute
even if this Court were to ultimately disagree with the trial court's conclusion.
Moreover, the trial court correctly interpreted the reduction and gang enhancement
statutes when it concluded that the reduction statute allowed it to reduce Vimahi's first
degree felony conviction to a second degree felony. The plain language of the reduction
statute allows a trial court to "enter a judgment for the next lower degree of offense."
The word "offense1' is plainly defined in the gang enhancement statute as aggravated
robbery in the context of this case. In addition, the gang enhancement statute plainly
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refers to the enhancement as an "enhanced penalty" and not an offense. Additionally, the
use of the word "offense" throughout the criminal code and the location of the gang
enhancement statute in the penalty chapter of the code rather than one of the offense
chapters demonstrates further that the offense for which Vimahi was convicted was a
first degree felony. Pursuant to the reduction statute, the trial court correctly lowered that
offense by one degree to a second degree felony. Moreover, since Vimahi never admitted
acting in concert with two or more persons, the gang enhancement could not be applied
to his penalty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF SHOULD BE DENIED IN THIS
CASE WHERE THE STATE IS ATTEMPTING TO SUBSTITUTE A
WRIT FOR AN APPEAL FROM AN ORDER WHICH THE STATE
DOES NOT OTHERWISE HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL.
Extraordinary relief should not be available in this case where the legislature has
not provided the state with the ability to appeal and the state is seeking to correct what it
contends was an error of law in analyzing a statute. Although extraordinary relief is
appropriate in cases where a trial court grossly and flagrantly abuses its discretion, in this
case where the state seeks simply to have this Court conduct appellate review to
determine whether the trial court erred in analyzing a statute, any error the trial court
arguably made in analyzing the statute does not qualify as a gross and flagrant abuse of
discretion. Because the legislature has not afforded the state the ability to appeal from a
reduction order and the state's request for extraordinary relief in this case is simply an
8

attempt to appeal an order that it does not otherwise have the ability to appeal,
extraordinary relief under Rule 656(d)(2)(A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should not
be extended to these circumstances.
Rule 65B(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the grounds for requesting
extraordinary relief based on a claim of wrongful use of judicial authority. It states in
relevant part:
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty;
actions by board of pardons and parole.
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the
court for relief.
(d)(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to
perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station.
Ut. R. Civ. P. 65B(d). "In deciding whether a petition for an extraordinary writ should
be granted, a court must look to the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged
in the petition, and the purpose of the type of writ sought in deciding whether to grant
extraordinary relief." Renn, 904 P.2d at 682.
The common law writ of mandamus was traditionally limited to confining "an
inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise
its authority when it is its duty to do so." Will v. United States. 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)
(citation omitted); see also Renn, 904 P.2d at 682. Although an extraordinary writ now
encompasses flagrant abuses of discretion, extraordinary circumstances are nevertheless
9

required, and granting a writ is a drastic remedy that should be "used sparingly." Burg v.
City of Seattle, 647 P.2d 517, 519 (Wash. 1982); Wffl, 389 U.S. at 95. In order to grant
extraordinary relief, this Court must determine that petitioner has established "sufficient
reasons and extraordinary conditions [which] warrant issuance of a writ of mandamus."
Idaho Falls Redev. Agency v. Countrymen, 794 P.2d 632, 632 (Idaho 1990).
The writ is available for abuses of judicial power where a "judge has exceeded his
jurisdiction" or "has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion." State ex rel.
Marslandv. Shintaku, 640 P.2d 289, 293 (Haw. 1982). It is not available, however, to
revise judicial action or as a writ of error. See. Stirba, 972 P.2d at 922-23; State ex rel.
Weber v.McFadden, 205 P. 594 (Nev. 1922); Utah Copper Co. v. Dist. Ct., 64 P.2d 241,
247 (Utah 1937) ("... mandamus will not lie unless the duty it is sought to enforce is a
legal duty, clear and free from doubt, and the right of the party seeking redress through
such remedy is equally clear, and that an application for such a writ may not be converted
into a writ of review or to review matters involving judgment and discretion of the court
below."). Moreover, the "mere fact" that other remedies are not available is not sufficient
justification for issuance of a writ. See State ex rel. Marsland, 640 P.2d at 293; Will, 389
U.S. at 97.
When the state seeks an extraordinary writ to review a trial court ruling that it
cannot otherwise appeal, unique concerns exist. See. Will, 389 U.S. at 96; Stirba, 972
P.2d at 923. Because appeals by the government are strictly limited "to narrow
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categories of orders," and are "'unusual, exceptional, and not favored,'" a writ "can
never be employed as a substitute for appeal in derogation of these clear policies [against
allowing the government to appeal except in narrowly and clearly delineated areas]."
Will 389 U.S. at 96 (further citations omitted).
In Utah, "[t]he Legislature has exactingly limited the judgments and orders from
which the State may appeal in criminal cases . . . ." Stirba, 972 P.2d at 923 (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (2003), the
legislature has "delineate[d] a narrow category of cases in which the prosecution may
take an appeal," and the state cannot appeal an order unless section 77-18a-1(2) expressly
provides for the appeal. See State v. Workman. 806 P.2d 1198,1201 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (citations omitted); State v. Kelbach. 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977). As the
state concedes, section 77-18a-l does not allow the state to appeal from a trial court's
reduction order. See state's brief at 7.
When the state does not have the ability to appeal from an order in a criminal case,
it "may not use the writ of mandamus to circumvent this restriction." Stirba, 972 P.2d at
920, 923, citing Petersen v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Utah
1995). In other words, when the legislature has specifically limited the state's ability to
appeal from an order, the state cannot substitute extraordinary relief to correct "a simple
mistake of law." Stirba, 972 P.2d at 923. Because the legislature has not allowed the
state to appeal from reduction orders, extraordinary relief should not be available under
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Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) to correct errors of law. See. id; see also Petersen, 907 P.2d at 1152;
Renn, 904 P.2d at 683 (M[b]ecause the Legislature has directed that there be no right of
appeal from Board of Pardons actions, Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3), mandamus and
certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a statutory appear).
The court of appeals held that the state could not use an extraordinary writ for
review of a trial court restitution order in Stirba because any error the trial court made in
interpreting the statute was not a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. 972 P.2d at 923.
The state argued in that case that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the restitution
statute then in effect when it ordered that '"a defendant cannot be required to pay
restitution . . . to a victim who has already been reimbursed by the victim's insurance
carrier . . . .'" IdL (quoting trial court order). Relying on this Court's decisions in Renn
and Petersen, the court of appeals concluded that since the state sought the same review
and relief it would have sought in an appeal and the legislature did not allow the state to
appeal from the order, extraordinary relief was not appropriate. IcL Because the state's
claim that the trial court had misinterpreted the statute was not a claim that the judge
grossly and flagrantly abused its discretion, the Court denied the state's request for
extraordinary relief under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) in order "to avoid transforming [the] action
into an impermissible appeal." IcL
In determining whether a trial court regularly pursued its authority in the context
of an abuse of discretion claim when the state seeks an extraordinary writ, this Court
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does not address the matter as if it were an appeal and simply correct errors of law. Id..
Instead, for a writ to issue under an "abuse of discretion" claim, the abuse "must be much
more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in routine appellate
review." Id at 922 (citing Renn, 904 P.2d at 683). The abuse of discretion must be
"'gross and flagrant5" and go beyond simple errors in interpreting a statute. Stirba, 972
P.2d at 922-23 (citing Renn, 904 P.2d at 683). In fact, the court explicitly stated in Stirba
that "a simple mistake of law does not qualify as the kind of gross and flagrant abuse of
discretion necessary for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(a) writ to issue." IcL at 923.
This Court reached the same decision in Renn that when the legislature "has
directed that there be no right to appeal..., mandamus and certiorari cannot be used as a
substitute for a statutory appeal." Renn, 904 P.2d at 683. The petitioner in Renn sought
extraordinary relief from a Board of Pardons "decision to postpone the hearing at which
his parole release date is set." Id, at 682. Although Renn could not use extraordinary
relief to challenge "substantive issues solely within the Board's discretion" because the
legislature did not provide for appeal of the Board's orders, he could challenge "the
fairness of the procedure followed by the Board in setting the parole rehearing date" as a
gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. Id. at 685.
This Court's decision in Petersen also demonstrates that extraordinary relief is not
available to correct a trial court's interpretation of a statute in circumstances where the
legislature has not afforded the state the right to appeal. See. Petersen, 907 P.2d at 1151-
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53. The petitioner in Petersen sought extraordinary relief from a Board of Pardons order
revoking his parole. IdL at 1150. Because the legislature has not afforded inmates the
right to appeal Board of Pardons decisions, this Court held that any issues raised by
petitioner that would ordinarily be raised in an appeal could not be considered for
extraordinary relief. Id. at 1152. Instead, extraordinary review was limited to only those
claims that were related to the Board's authority to revoke Petersen's parole. Id.
Pursuant to Petersen, when the legislature has precluded appellate review, a
petitioner cannot seek the same relief through extraordinary means that it would have
sought through direct appeal. In this case, where the state is using the extraordinary
relief procedure to seek the same review and to make the same argument it would have
made on direct appeal, extraordinary relief is not appropriate. See id at 1152 ("The
extraordinary writs do not, however, authorize this Court to exercise the same scope of
review as may be exercised pursuant to statutory appeals.").
Additionally, the rule that extraordinary relief cannot be used "to correct alleged
error occurring in the exercise of [] judicial discretion" has been applied throughout
Utah's statehood. See State v. Hart. 57 P. 415, 416 (Utah 1899). In fact, although the
state relies on Hart in support of its argument that extraordinary relief is appropriate in
this case (see state's brief at 9), Hart actually tells us that "mandamus will not lie to direct
or control the decision of an inferior court in a matter within its discretion, or to direct a
court how it shall decide a case" and instead is used "when a court erroneously refuses to
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act in matters within its jurisdiction." 1(1 Hart therefore supports Vimahi's claim that the
state cannot use the extraordinary writ procedure to ask this Court to review the trial
court's interpretation of the reduction statute.
In an effort to overcome the dictates of Stirba, Petersen and Renn that preclude the
use of extraordinary relief to correct error when the state does not have the right to
appeal, the state relies for the most part on civil cases and an unpublished court of
appeals decision. See state's brief at 9-11. Because these cases do not involve
circumstances where the legislature had precluded the petitioner from appealing or
otherwise are not compelling, they do not provide convincing support for the state's
claim that it can use the extraordinary relief process to reach its claims that the trial court
erred in interpreting a statute.
For example, Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890
P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995) involves a civil matter where a party subpoenaed the counseling
records of the opposing party from the Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic. Id. at
1018. The Clinic resisted the subpoena because the records were privileged. After the
trial court ruled that the records were not privileged and the Clinic must release them, the
Clinic filed a petition for extraordinary relief with this Court. Id. at 1018-19. The Clinic
was not a party to the action below and the legislature had not precluded its ability to
appeal the matter. Since the Clinic did not have an appeal available, the legislature had
not precluded its ability to appeal, and the harm in releasing the privileged material was
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irreparable, use of an extraordinary writ to determine whether the trial court had
"regularly pursued its authority" or otherwise grossly abused its discretion in ordering the
release of privileged records was appropriate in that case. See. id. at 1019.
Kawamoto v. Fratto, 2000 UT 6, 994 P.2d 187, likewise does not support the
state's argument that it can use an extraordinary writ to correct simple mistakes of law in
circumstances where the legislature has precluded an appeal. Kawamoto involved a civil
small claims matter where petitioner did not have the right to appeal the judgment. See
id, Tfl n. 1. The review requested by petitioner, however, was not a request that this
Court review the trial court's interpretation of a statute. Instead, petitioner claimed that
the trial court grossly abused its discretion and failed to perform an act required by
constitutional law when it refused to allow petitioner to present evidence through
witnesses. IdL at ^[8. Because the trial court's actions in refusing to allow the petitioner
to present witnesses violated due process and fit within traditional grounds for granting
mandamus, they were a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion requiring extraordinary
relief. I d at ^fl|8, 9. By contrast, in the present case, the state is simply trying to use the
extraordinary relief process to reach an issue that would otherwise be reached in an
appeal if the state had the right to appeal. Because the legislature has precluded the state
from appealing this type of order, use of the extraordinary relief process to determine
whether a trial court correctly analyzed and applied a statute is inappropriate. See Stirba,
972P.2dat923.
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Finally, the state relies on State v. Barrett, 2004 UT App 239, an unpublished
court of appeals opinion. Barrett, however, involved a claim under Rule 65B(d)(2)(B)
that the trial judge "failed to perform an act required by law," and not a claim under Rule
65B(d)(2)(A) that a trial court grossly abused its discretion in deciding an issue. Because
the trial court failed to follow the procedure set forth in the statute for imposing
restitution, the court of appeals granted extraordinary relief to the state under
Rule 65B(d)(2)(B). I d ; see also Kawamoto. 2000 UT 6 at ^[8. Claiming that a trial court
did not perform an act that it was required to perform is different, however, from the
state's claim in this case that although the court performed the act, it erred in interpreting
the statute. In the present case, the state claims only that the trial court abused its
discretion under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) and not that the judge failed to perform an act of law
pursuant to Rule 65B(d)(2)(B). See. state's brief at 9. Since the trial court performed the
act required by law in this case and the state is instead seeking appellate review of a trial
court ruling interpreting a statute, Barrett does not provide guidance.
As it did in Stirba, the state in this case confuses the abuse of discretion standard
required for reversal as part of an appeal with the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion
required for an extraordinary writ. See state's brief at 2, 11-13; Stirba, 972 P.2d at 92223. In fact, the state incorrectly contends in its standard of review section at 2 that the
simple abuse of discretion standard of review applicable to sentencing issues on appeal
applies in this case. The state's reliance on the standard of review applicable to
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sentencing claims on direct appeal rather than the more demanding gross and flagrant
abuse of discretion standard necessary for extraordinary relief further demonstrates that
the state is attempting to substitute extraordinary relief for an appeal and that
extraordinary relief is not appropriate in this case.
Even if the state were correct that the trial court misinterpreted the reduction
statute, it has made no showing that it grossly and flagrantly abused its discretion in
analyzing the statute. The record shows that the trial court followed rules of statutory
construction and therefore did not grossly and flagrantly abuse its discretion in analyzing
the reduction statute; even if this Court were to ultimately disagree with the trial court's
analysis, the trial court did not grossly abuse its discretion in reaching that conclusion. In
addition, as set forth in the following point, the trial court's ruling is supported by the
plain language of the reduction statute, the plain language of the gang enhancement
statute and the language of the criminal code in general. In fact, the state has failed to
adequately brief its argument that the trial court's analysis of the statute was incorrect, let
alone to sustain its even greater burden of establishing that the trial grossly abused its
discretion and that such abuse was '"clear and indisputable.'" Will, 389 U.S. at 96.
Since the legislature has precluded the state from appealing errors of law in this
context, use of an extraordinary writ as a substitute for appeal is inappropriate. Vimahi
respectfully requests that the state's request for extraordinary relief be dismissed.
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GROSSLY AND
FLAGRANTLY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REDUCING THE
OFFENSE FOR WHICH VIMAHI WAS CONVICTED FROM A FIRST
DEGREE FELONY OFFENSE TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY
OFFENSE.
Even if this Court were to review the merits of the state's claim, the petition
should be denied because the trial court correctly applied Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402
(2003). Rules of statutory construction and the plain language of the reduction statute,
the gang enhancement statute, and the criminal code in general demonstrate that the trial
court did not grossly abuse its discretion in analyzing the statute and also that the trial
court correctly interpreted the reduction statute to allow a reduction from a first degree
felony offense to a second degree felony offense.
The reduction statute allows a trial court in the exercise of its discretion to reduce
the degree of an offense for which a defendant is convicted by one degree. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-402 states in pertinent part:
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and
character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record
the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute and
to sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a
judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and impose
sentence accordingly.

(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless
the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the
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offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced
under this section by more than two degrees.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2003); see. complete text in Addendum C.
The state does not take issue with the trial court's exercise of discretion in finding
that this case was appropriate for reduction under the statute. Rather, the state argues
that the trial court erred in interpreting the statute to allow a reduction from a first degree
felony offense with an enhanced gang penalty to a second degree felony offense. State's
brief at 11-14. According to the state, a one step reduction in the degree of the offense
from a first degree felony with a gang enhanced penalty would be to a first degree felony
without the enhanced penalty. State's brief at 11-14. This argument is incorrect in light
of the plain language of the reduction statute, the plain language of the gang
enhancement statute, the organization of the criminal code, and the use of the word
"offense" throughout the criminal code.2

2

The state fails to adequately brief its claim that the reduction statute required the
trial court to enter judgment for a first degree felony. The state fails to acknowledge
rules of statutory construction or the plain language of the reduction statute. See state's
brief at 12-13. It also fails to acknowledge the plain language of the gang enhancement
statute which uses the term "offense" to refer to the crime and not to the crime with an
enhanced sentence. Additionally, the state fails to acknowledge the consistent use of the
word "offense11 throughout the criminal code. Instead, the state simply makes a
conclusory statement to support its assertion. State's brief at 12-13. If this case were on
direct appeal, this Court could refuse to review the merits of the state's claim due the
inadequacy of its briefing. See Utah R. App. P. 24; State v. Green. 2005 UT 9, fl 1,
P.3d
("a brief which does not fully identify, analyze and cite its legal arguments may
be 'disregarded as stricken"). In this request for extraordinary relief where the state has
an even greater burden to establish that the judge grossly or flagrantly abused his
discretion in order to obtain extraordinary relief, the conclusory statements and
20

In interpreting a statute, courts first consider the plain language of the statute.
Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 22 h f 12. 51 P.3d 1288. When
considering the plain language, courts "presume that the legislature used each word
advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs.. Inc.. 2001 UT 29,112, 24 P.3d 928 (citations
omitted). Courts "'read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other statute in the same chapter and related chapters.'" State
v. Ireland. 2005 UT App 22, Tf8,

P.3d

(quoting Miller v. Weaver . 2003 UT 12,

f 17, 66 P.3d 592). Where the language of a statute is plain, courts "need not apply other
interpretative tools" in analyzing the statute. Adams v. Swensen. 2005 UT 8, ^8,
P.3d

(citations omitted).
The plain language of section 76-3-402 tells us that a trial judge may in his or her

discretion lower the "degree of an offense" and "enter judgment of conviction for the
next lower category offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. In other words, the language
of the reduction statute plainly states that when a trial judge believes that the offense
should be reduced, the reduction is to the next lower "degree of offense," i.e. the "next
lower category of offense." IcL
The plain language of the gang enhancement statute also makes it clear that the

inadequate briefing are not sufficient to establish that extraordinary relief is appropriate
or necessary. See generally Will 389 U.S. at 96 (government has burden of showing "its
right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable'") (citations omitted).
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term "offense" refers to the underlying charge and not the enhanced penalty. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 states in part:
76-3-203.L Offenses committed in concert with two or more persons Notice - Enhanced penalties.
(1)
(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection
(4) is subject to an enhanced penalty as provided in Subsection (3)
if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person
acted in concert with two or more persons.
(3) The enhanced penalty for a:
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) a class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony;
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony;
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not
less than nine years and which may be for life.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b or
37c, regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5,
Parti;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5,
Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5,
Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter
6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6,
Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) anyfraudoffense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except
Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-5-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516,
76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520.
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(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under
Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 3, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 768-304, 76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section
76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as
defined in Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter
10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus
Passenger Safety Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of
Unlawful Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money
Laundering and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 7610-2002.
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this
section that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in
concert are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any
of those persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser
offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (2003) (emphasis added). Plainly, the term "offense" is
used to refer to the underlying offense for which a defendant was convicted and the term
"enhanced penalty" is used to refer to penalty imposed if an offense is committed in
concert with two or more persons. IcL Although the state argues that subsection (3)
demonstrates that the trial court erred in lowering the category of offense by one degree,
that argument ignores the plain language of the gang enhancement which clarifies that
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offenses are the underlying crime and not the crime with an enhanced penalty attached.
In fact, in referring to offenses, the gang enhancement statute plainly states that
"[a] person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to an enhanced
penalty . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1 )(a) (emphasis added). The offenses
listed in subsection (4) include robbery and aggravated robbery. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203. l(4)(i). Hence, the gang enhancement statute itself plainly defines the
"offense" as aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in this case and not the enhanced
penalty set forth in subsection (3) of the gang enhancement statute. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-3-203.1(4)(i), 76-6-302 (2003).
While the state is correct that subsection (3) of the gang enhancement statute
creates an enhanced penalty when a person is convicted of a first degree felony, that
enhanced penalty of nine years to life does not constitute an offense under the gang
enhancement statute. Indeed, section 76-3-203.1 plainly differentiates between offenses,
which include robbery and aggravated robbery as listed in subsection (4), and enhanced
penalties, as listed in subsection (3). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(3) & (4). Contrary
to the state's argument, the plain language of the gang enhancement statute clarifies that
"offenses" are listed in subsection (4) and "enhanced penalties" are listed in subsection
(3). Id Since the reduction statute allows a trial court to reduce "an offense" by one
degree, the trial court correctly reduced the offense of first degree felony aggravated
robbery to a second degree felony.
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In addition to the plain language of the gang enhancement and reduction statutes,
the organization of the criminal code and the use of the word "offense'1 throughout the
criminal code further demonstrates that the offense that the trial court reduced was the
first degree felony offense of aggravated robbery. Chapters 4 through 10 of Title 76
designate criminal offenses; the offense in this case is designated in chapter 6 at Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003). The first three chapters of Title 76 do not designate
offenses and instead discuss general provisions, principles of responsibility and
punishments. The gang enhancement statute is found in chapter 3, the punishment
chapter, and explicitly deals with punishments and provides for an enhanced penalty.
Even a cursory reading of section 76-3-203.1 conveys that any enhancement imposed
under that statute creates an "enhanced penalty" and does not create an "offense".
Despite the consistent use of the term "offense" throughout the code to refer to the
actual offense and not to any enhanced penalty created by the gang enhancement and the
plain language of the reduction and gang enhancement statutes, the state argues that
because the gang enhancement "generally raises the degree of the offense one degree," a
one step reduction of a first degree felony with gang enhancement results in a first degree
felony. See state's brief at 12-13. Aside from ignoring rules of statutory construction
and the language of the relevant statutes, this argument does not follow in cases where a
first degree felony is enhanced.
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The state contends in its brief at 12 that when a gang enhancement is attached for
any offense other than a first degree felony, the enhanced penalty "generally raises the
degree of the offense one degree." State's brief at 12. More clearly stated, however,
subsection (3) of the gang enhancement statute indicates that when a gang enhancement
is attached, the penalty is generally raised to the penalty for an offense that is one degree
higher. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(3) (2003) provides the enhanced penalty for gang
enhancements as follows:
The enhanced penalty for a :
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony;
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony;
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate sentence of not less than
nine years and which may be for life.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (2003).
Because the penalty is generally raised to the penalty for an offense one degree
higher under the gang enhancement statute, the state concludes that a reduction of one
offense by one degree when a defendant has been convicted of a first degree felony with
a gang enhancement results in a first degree felony. State's brief at 12-13. The language
of subsection (3) of the gang enhancement statute set forth above belies the state's claim
since the gang enhancement does not create a new offense and instead enhances the
penalty. See discussion supra at 23-27.
Moreover, when a first degree felony is enhanced, the state's claim that the gang
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enhancement "generally" enhances penalty by one degree does not apply because a first
degree felony remains a first degree felony even if a gang enhancement is attached. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203. l(3)(e). Even if the state had an argument in other contexts that
the gang enhancement raises the degree of the offense by one degree rather than
extending the length of the sentence, such an argument does not apply to first degree
felonies. This is so because when afirstdegree felony is enhanced, the degree of the
offense remains the same - afirstdegree felony. Hence, the state's conclusory argument
is incorrect not only because it disregards the plain language of the relevant statutes but
also because the general rule espoused by the state does not apply when a first degree
felony is enhanced. Since the reduction statute allows a trial court to "enter a judgment
of the next lowest degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly," pursuant to the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) as well as the plain language of the
gang enhancement statute, the trial court correctly lowered the offense from a first degree
felony to a second degree felony.
As a final matter, although the plea affidavit notified Vimahi that the in concert
provision "adds additional four years to sentence," it does not contain an admission of the
in concert facts; nor does the factual basis for the plea contain any facts relating to
in concert or gang activity. Because the record does not show that Vimahi admitted the
in concert facts, the record does not establish that absent the reduction, an enhanced gang
penalty would apply. R. 98-99; see Addendum E. Reversing the trial court's decision to
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reduce the conviction to a second degree felony and imposing a gang enhancement
would be inappropriate under these circumstances.
In this case where the degree of offense for which Vimahi was convicted was a
first degree felony, the trial court correctly concluded that the reduction statute allowed it
to enter judgment for a second degree felony, which was the next lowest degree of
offense. Moreover, by following accepted rules of statutory construction in relying on
the plain language of the statutes, the trial court did not grossly and flagrantly abuse its
discretion even if this Court were to disagree with the trial court's analysis. Accordingly,
the state's request for extraordinary relief should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Real Party in Interest/Defendant Inoke Vimahi, by and through counsel,
respectfully requests that this Court dismiss or deny the state's request for extraordinary
relief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this W*

day of March, 2005.

\ r&^ c oc£cy
JOAN C. WATT
VERNICE S. TREASE
Attorneys for Defendant Vimahi
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT 'LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, i 'OP IMH'1 1KNT

vs

Case No : , : - - . . .

INOKE VIMAHI,
. Defendant

Judge:
Date:

.:ILLIA>
September

PRESENT
Cl€>rk:
nancyw
Reporter: GREEN, TEENA
: :
Prosecutor: BURMESTER
\
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney (s,/ ; TREASE, VERNICE S
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 27, "19°!
CAT/CIC
Tape Number:
38
Tape Count: 11:45
CHARGES
]

ROBBERY (amended)
2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/04/2004 G-.

HEARING
TAPE: 38
COUNT; 11i4 5
Defense remarks regarding r e a c t i o n j; sentence
States response
4 02 motion to reduce granted

Page 1

y

BARRETT
2004

:

Case No: 031902300
Date:
Sep 13, 2004
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 3ato
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah .State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison time on this case to run concurrent with Judge Boydens
sentence
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
commitment sent to the jail with transportation
granted.
Charge severity decreased from to.
Dated this

i3

day of

^i_ pr

District Court Judge
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State of Utah,
Petitioner,
Case No. 20040963-SC

v.
The Honorable William W. Barrett,
Respondent,
Inoke Vimal"
Ko« L Par ty i i 1 Interest.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on petition for
extraordinary relief. The Court requests full briefing and
argument pursuant to Rule 24, and any other pertinent provisions,
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. For purposes of judicial
efficiency, the State's motion to consolidate with case number
20040763 is granted. All further pleadings in connection with
either petition shall be filed under that number. The State
shall file a single brief addressing its objection to the
sentencing of the Real Parties in Interest, James Kida Pauu and .
Inoke Vimahi. The Respondent may file a brief if so desired.
The Real Parties in Interest may file separate responsive briefs,
or a joint brief if so desired.

A)rt-lti
Date

X&f
Michael J. Wilkins
Associate Chief Justice

ADDENDUM C

76-3-203.1. Offenses committed in concert with two or
more persons — Notice — Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject
to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the
trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in
concert with two or more persons.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in
committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged,
and each of the other persons:
(i) was physically present; or
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4).
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii):
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent
to engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant;
and
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be
a party if he were an adult.
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned,
shall cause to be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the
defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section.
(3) The enhanced penalty for a:
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony;
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony;
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than
nine years and which may be for life.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 766-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and
76-6-520;

(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76,
Chapter 8, Part 3, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307,
76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety
Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that
the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are
charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.

76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to
be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class
A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of
probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his
probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney,
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper.
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony
information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal
would be in the interest of justice;
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a final order under Subsection (2)(a), a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as
charged or a pretrial order dismissing or quashing in part a felony
information, when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides
that the appeal would be in the interest of justice;
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest; or
(h) a finding pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 15a, Exemptions from Death
Penalty in Capital Cases, that a capital defendant is exempt from a
sentence of death, when upon a petition for review the appellate court
decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of TVustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a
first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Art. VIII, § 3

Sec. 3, [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the
United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all
other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all
writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
or the complete determination of any cause.

ADDENDUM D

VERNICE S. TREASE (BARN0.5243)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ONE
STEP REDUCTION OF DEGREE OF
OFFENSE AT TIME OF SENTENCING
PURSUANT TO UCA § 76-3-402

Plaintiff,
v.
INOKE VIMAHI
Defendant.

:

Case No. 031902300FS

:

JUDGE WILLIAM W. BARRETT

The above-named defendant, INOKE VIMAHI, through his attorney, Vernice S.
Trease, respectfully moves pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-402, that his conviction for
aggravated robbery, afirstdegree felony, be reduced one degree lower to a second degree felony
at the time of sentencing. UCA § 76-3-402 provides that unless otherwise provided by law, the
court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose
sentence accordingly. The offense of aggravated robbery is not an enumerated offense under
UCA § 76-3-406 for which the reduction sought by defendant is prohibited.
Three co-defendants were charged in conjunction with this case. (State v. Lui Maile.
Case No. 031902299FS. State v. James K. Pauu, Case No. 031902297FS and State v. Shannon
K. Pantoia, Case No. 031902298FS.) A fourth suspect, William Rogers Liti, was interviewed
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by the police and admitted to being present during the commission of these charges but it is
unknown to defendant whether or not charges were filed against Mr. Liti. All charges against
co-defendant, Ms. Pantoja, the driver of the vehicle that transported the defendants to the scene
of the crime, were dismissed by the State in exchange for her agreement to testify as a State
witness. Co-defendants Lui Maile and James K. Pauu both pled tofirstdegree aggravated
robbery charges and were sentenced one degree lower to second degree felonies. Co-defendants
Lui Maile and James K. Pauu were identified by the alleged victim, Scott Burke, as the
individuals who entered the home and robbed him.

Mr. Vimahi was not identified as being a

participant in the robbery by Mr. Burke at a line up held in this case. If there was any
identification of Mr. Vimahi by Mr. Burke it was after the line up and in court where it was
obvious that Mr. Vimahi was a defendant. Furthermore, Mr. Burke indicated to the police that
only three individuals entered his home during the robbery. Ms. Pantoja, the codefendant/witness for the State indicated on at least two interviews that the three individuals who
left her vehicle presumably to enter Mr. Burke's house were Lui Maile, James Pauu and William
Liti. She indicated that Mr. Vimahi stayed at the car with her for several minutes before
wondering off. Infact, it was the State original theory of the case that Mr. Vimahi did not enter
the victim's home but instead stood outside as the "look out". After defendant waived
preliminary hearing and prior to trial, the State disclosed evidence of a fingerprint analysis
matched to Mr. Vimahi. Mr. Vimahi, similar to the other co-defendants, pled guilty to
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. Mr. Vimahi's culpability in this case is not much
different from the other co-defendants. He pled guilty to the same charge as the other codefendants.

The other co-defendants have been sentenced one degree lower. It is fair,
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equitable and in the interest of justice for all co-defendants in this particular case to be sentenced
in a similar manner.
State argues that Mr. Vimahi was on probation for a third degree felony, reckless
endangerment when he committed this offense. Co-defendant, Lui Maile, was on probation for
a more serious charge of robbery, a second degree felony, when he was sentenced one degree
lower on this case.
The State argues that Mr. Vimahi should not receive the reduction granted the other codefendants because he did not accept the initial plea offer made by the State of a second degree
felony and only agreed to plead after evidence of thefingerprintanalysis was disclosed to him.
Mr. Vimahi waived the preliminary hearing and allrightsattached thereto based upon the plea
offer to the second degree felony. The State stipulated to the waiver of the preliminary hearing
and benefitted by not having to call witnesses and put on the preliminary hearing, especially
given the fact that Ms. Pantoja, a key State witness, was a reluctant witness and had failed to
appear at several preliminary hearings. The State extended this plea offer, which was different
from what was offer to the other co-defendants, because the State's evidence against Mr. Vimahi
was substantially weaker than that against the other co-defendants. After the preliminary
hearing phase, when the State finally analyzed a fingerprint they had in their possession since
beginning of this case and determined it was a match to Mr. Vimahi, the State determined their
case was stronger and immediately withdrew the offer of a second degree felony and offered a
first degree felony. The State acknowledges by the plea negotiations that have occurred in this
case that as circumstances and evidence changes, they could change the plea offer extended to
Mr. Vimahi. Mr. Vimahi could have insisted on a remand of this case for preliminary hearing
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once the offer was changed. Mr. Vimahi did not make that request because he accepted the
evidence the State presented to him.

It should not be held against Mr. Vimahi that he chose to

exercise his constitutional rights tofightthe charges against him when the State acknowledged
by their plea offer that they had a weak case against Mr. Vimahi.

Had the State presented the

fingerprint analysis evidence earlier in the case, Mr. Vimahi would have pled sooner.
The defendant is young and will be 23 years old at the time of sentencing. He has
already been committed to the Utah State Prison for a zero to five year commitment on the third
degree felony, reckless endangerment charge that was before the Honorable Ann Boyden. He is
awaiting sentence on a federal charge and expects to serve a substantial amount of time in federal
prison on that case.

Considering all the circumstances in this case, committing Mr. Vimahi to

prison on a first degree felony for a term offiveyears to life on this case would be unduly harsh.
Especially given reduced sentence that has been imposed for the other two co-defendant, the
dismissal of the charges against co-defendant Pantoja and the likelihood that one of the main
participants in this case was never charged.

Even if the court were to grant defendant's motion

and sentence him one degree lower, it is likely that Mr. Vimahi will serve most if not all of the
one to fifteen year commitment on this case. Mr. Vimahi will likely not be released from prison
until he is at least in his 40s.
Mr. Burke is the named victim in this case. This is not the first time Mr. Burke has been
the alleged victim in a home invasion type robbery that is characterized by evidence that he was
also breaking the law by possessing illegal controlled substances and guns. Mr. Burke was the
alleged victim in another home invasion type robbery where Ms. Buchi and Ms. Trease
represented co-defendants charged. In the present case, the defendants allege that the reason
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they went to Mr. Burke's apartment was because Mr. Burke owed money for drugs. Mr. Burke
had methamphetamine and an AK-47 assault rifle in his apartment. The fact that Mr. Burke is
breaking the law by possessing drugs and that he may expect some level of risk or danger when
he associates with people who use/sell drugs or who run around with AK-47s is also a factor this
court may consider when determining if it is in the interest ofjustice to sentence Mr. Vimahi to a
second degree felony.
Mr. Vimahi request that the court sentence the aggravated robbery charge as a second
degree felony and impose a one to fifteen year sentence for that offense.
Respectfully submitted this /. S day of September, 2004.
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VERNICE S. TREASE
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorney's
Office, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

/3
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day of September, 2004.

ADDENDUM E

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTD7ICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.
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Defendant.

, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleadingjguiltyfor no contest) to the following crimes:
Degree
Crime & Statutory
Punishment
Provision
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
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I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it readjto-me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading |uihy,(or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleadii^gutit^(or no contest) are:
^
^
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thafby pleading guilty
guilty II will be admitting that I committed /the crimes
>yU4+*'i Understand mafVpleadirk
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest):
,
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Waiver of Constitutional Rights

>'-

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
unierthe constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
''guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's servige-tcune.
I <(have nqtXliave) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel,
I havFHone so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

MP7
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleai
(or no contest). I also. understand my rights in this case and other cases
consequences of mVguilty (or no contest) plea(s).

(j-'(Wv->

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
My attomey,^nd I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (opno contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and puljlie-tri^l by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleadii^guil^(or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would
pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not p l e a d ^ l t y y
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each

element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead(juiltyyi[or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting thaTTcfommitted the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have therightto appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay thc^cCosts for me. I understand that I am giving up
myrightto appeal my conviction if I ple^a guilWor no contest). I understand that if I wish
to appeal my sentence I must file a notiee^fappeal within 30 days after my sentence is
entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering avGuiltyj^or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I kacrvrthe maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading/guilty(p£ no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carriesVrBSindatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term,fine,or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaitineseirterKjing
on another offense~of which I have been convicted or which I have plead mfityjpt no
contest), my^ntyj^et no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

Plea agreement. Mynguiltyjfor no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my ownfreewill and chpieer-No force, threats, or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plea^guilty (of no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been maaelEcrme.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I amfreeto
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am^^Vyears of age. I have attended school through the \}H grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I amfreeof any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent mefromunderstanding what I am doing
orfromknowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guiltyW no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before senlence is announced. I understand
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the PostConviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Dated this J^Tday of
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DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for r }r[d\j£
[I\/71.dJhi
the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.
K">
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No. ' < / ^ 7
&

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against^
\l\ YJ}& {) (
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the ofifense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Bar No.
_/

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oraljepresentations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's (guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
;/

Dated this " f ^ L day of
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

